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VIRTUOUS FRIENDS: MORALITY AND QUAKER IDENTITY 
Jackie Leach Scully 
Newcastle University, England 
ABSTRACT 
Recent work in moral philosophy and psychology has made deep connections between questions 
of morality and identity, suggesting that orientation to a moral framework, through community 
practices and discourses, contributes to the individual sense of self. I argue that contemporary Liberal 
Quakers in Britain thus use their moral judgments among other things to reinforce their social 
identity as Quakers, emphasising a shared approach to ethical framework and sources of authority 
over the substantive content of the judgments. The favoured ethical framework of Liberal British 
Quakers appears to be a form of virtue ethics, and I explore the possibility that links between virtue 
ethics on the one hand and the concepts of testimony and discernment on the other, enable the use 
of a virtue ethics approach to reinforce a sense of Quaker identity. 
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Ethics must deal with being good as well as producing good 
-May 1994: 75. 
INTRODUCTION 
Human beings evolved as group animals and, given the chance, most people still opt 
to live in collectives with others. An important part of what makes life in groups 
possible are the rules about how we ought to behave towards those others, rules that 
we call morality.1 Although there is an assumption in modernist ethics that 'moral 
behaviour' is about the acts of individuals, the fact that people rarely live in isolation 
means moral behaviour is necessarily about individuals interacting in societies. 
Whatever function they serve for the individual, ethical statements are therefore also 
statements about the groups in which we live.2 Descriptive ethics give more direct 
accounts, but even prescriptive ethics indirectly say a great deal about a society by 
presenting the kind of societal ideals, priorities and values it encourages, who the 
prescriptions are intended to cover, and who has the authority to make them. 
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Recent work in moral philosophy and psychology has foregrounded the idea that 
questions of morality are inescapably also questions about identities. Charles Taylor 
and other philosophers argue that to understand oneself as a self entails alignment to 
the moral framework of one's community (Taylor 1989). These theorists are not 
making the obvious statement that moral choices contribute to a person's moral 
identity, but that orientation to a moral framework, provided through the practices 
and discourses of the community, is a major part of knowing in general who we are. 
These scholars are saying that the stance we adopt to beliefs about right forms of 
living not only shapes our personal moral worlds, but makes statements, to ourselves 
as much as to others, about the nature of the various social groupings to which we 
belong. The moral frameworks to which we align ourselves are not clearly articulated 
codes or guidelines-these come later, when moral beliefs are justified or defended. 
Rather, they are the backgrounds of belief generated by the practices of the commu­
nity. These practices constitute socially embodied, largely unspoken statements about 
what constitutes a good life for the community and its members. They describe basic 
values, and prescribe modes of living that reflect those values adequately in the eyes 
of the community. They also define procedures for making judgments in situations 
of difficulty-for example, they indicate how to identifY the sources of moral author­
ity. For the most part we are not conscious of the background of rules and values 
with which we work, especially when all the intersecting groups to which we belong 
are compatible. But because many people in contemporary society participate in a 
large number of interlocking and nested groups, and these groups will often have 
their own, subtly distinct pictures of the good life, the contribution of morality to 
identity becomes complicated. Conscious negotiation may be necessary when what is 
taken for granted is suddenly exposed as open to question, for example if a new 
social situation makes the differences between groups more apparent; or if the mores 
of one group change faster than another; or if someone joins a new group that has 
radically different moral expectations. 
In this article I argue that contemporary Liberal Quakers in Britain use moral 
judgment to reinforce their social identity as Quakers. They do this through the 
ethical framework and the sources of authority they use, more than the substantive 
content of those judgments. Based on empirical observation of Friends' moral evalua­
tions, I have previously suggested that Liberal Quakers today use a 'collage' approach, 
with the tradition known as virtue ethics having an especially prominent (but not 
exclusive) place (Scully 2002). Here I explore further links between virtue ethics and 
key features of Quaker faith and practice that make the virtue approach so appealing 
to Friends. 
MORAL EVALUATION IN BRITAIN YEARLY MEETING 
Between 1995 and 1997 I undertook a project within Britain Yearly Meeting, as a 
Quaker Fellow funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, focusing on the 
ethical issues raised by advances in gene technology. Through this I was also able to 
make systematic observations ofBritish Quakers' processes of ethical evaluation: how 
they identifY situations of moral difficulty, describe and structure them, the precedents 
1 1 0  QUAKER STUDIES 
and values that inform their deliberations, and so on. Although the project was 
formally about genetic ethical dilemmas, the key observations seem applicable to 
ethical issues more broadly, as indicated by Chambers (2008). 
A fuller account of the results is available elsewhere (Scully 2002). Two of the 
central conclusions were unexpected, at least to me. The first was to do with the 
method if evaluation that Friends used. Religious groups generally have a deontological 
bias to their ethics: they tend to organise their thinking around principles whose 
moral authority derives from their theological basis. Ethical commandments are 
accepted by the group because they are the word of God, for example. In the 
Christian tradition the Ten Commandments and the commandment of Jesus are 
often taken as the primary set of ethical principles; and orders like 'Thou shalt not 
kill', or 'you must love your neighbour as yourself become moral imperatives because 
of their perceived status as articulations of what God wants. I had anticipated that as a 
religious group, Quakers' moral evaluations would be consistently deontological. 
This turned out to be wrong. Friends did show one distinctive deontological trait 
(and I will return to that later), but other, non-deontological approaches were 
equally or more popular. 
By far the most consistent feature was that when faced with a moral problem, the 
study participants constructed what I call a moral collage. By collage I mean that they 
did not use the theoretically consistent, logically coherent form of argumentation that 
professional philosophers are obliged to generate. Their disinclination to do so might 
have been predicted by their lack of philosophical training. However, from the 
comments that participants made it was also clear that, on the whole, whether they 
could do it or not was beside the point, because constructing a consistent and coher­
ent argument was not their real aim. What mattered was not theoretical consistency 
nor the construction of what philosophers are fond of calling a 'killer argument', but 
whether participants could adequately articulate their interpretation of the morally 
difficult situation at each stage in the process of understanding it and reaching a 
conclusion about the best way forward. Fidelity to what was discerned was more 
important than consistency to an analytic framework. From a philosophical point of 
view, using more than one school of argument at a time shows incoherence. From 
the users' point of view, however, it could equally well suggest that real problems are 
not in fact best tackled by sticking to any one style of argument, that doing so might 
be inadequate to provide workable solutions, and moreover that pushing one theo­
retical approach to its limits is guaranteed (as philosophers know only too well) to 
reveal its weaknesses. 
Hence Friends were willing to pick up and put down analytic methods as 'seemed 
right'. In the art of collage, diverse media are combined to give an expressive whole 
that makes sense in its entirety, even though made up of elements that would not 
normally be found together. By analogy, Friends selected elements from the ethical 
traditions available to them that seemed most appropriate at any given point. Coher­
ence was maintained not by sticking strictly to the parameters of a theory, but by 
using concepts and symbols that unite Friends' moral understanding with elements 
from their religious lives. Among these, as I shall discuss later, are concepts associated 
with the testimonies. 
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Making a 'moral collage' therefore does not imply that participants invent ethical 
elements wholesale. Just as in a real collage it is possible to identifY the square of 
purple velvet or the end of cornflake packet, moral collages also contain patterns of 
argumentation that could be mapped onto standard ethical theories. It was possible to 
identifY statements that fit comfortably within a consequentialist argument, a casuist 
formulation, or a deontological justification, for example. Some participants may 
have been drawing on an academic knowledge of utilitarianism or of Kant, but in 
fact the arrow of cause and effect is likely to point in the opposite direction. That is, 
the fragmentary resemblances reflect the origins of all ethical models and theories: 
however technically sophisticated, they originate in and are elaborated from features 
of the everyday approaches people bring to their real-life moral quandaries. 
Since carrying out this project, other research (Scully et al. 2006 a, b; Banks et al. 
2006) suggest that the use of moral collage is in fact characteristic of secular lay moral 
discourse. The way in which academic moral philosophers go about ethical analysis is 
not how most people do so. In fact an increasing amount of evidence from moral 
psychology and cognitive science suggests that people tend to form moral intuitions 
rather rapidly, which they then back up with compelling (to them) arguments (see, 
e.g., Haidt 2001). The moral collage would then be used to articulate and refine, and 
must be congruent with, these intuitions. 
Use of something like moral collage is so widespread it cannot be considered 
distinctive of Quakers. Nor can it be assigned to one or other groups within liberal­
Liberal Quakerism. Both Pilgrim's Inclusivists and Syncretists (Pilgrim 2008) would, 
I think, use the collage approach. (Exclusivists might not, for the same reason that 
non-secular lay discourse can deviate from the moral collage model: the preferred use 
of strongly deontological, scripturally based argument.) What is particular to Liberal 
Quakers, and might vary between subgroups of Liberal Quakers, is the pattern of 
which ethical elements are prioritised and which left aside. Although the moral 
evaluations of these Quaker participants were, as one might say, collaginous, not all 
ethical theories or analytic frameworks were equally popular, just as collage makers 
might not find themselves drawn towards cardboard, preferring the purple velvet. 
Although consequentialist reasoning was common, for example, utilitarian thinking 
was less so, and contractarian approaches were notably absent. By contrast, one 
approach turned up repeatedly: a mode of thinking that relied on a model of the 
person who could do no other than act in accordance with the good. The closest paral­
lel to this in standard ethical theory is virtue ethics. 
VIRTUE ETHICS 
Virtue ethics is one of the three main strands of contemporary ethics, along with 
Kantian deontology and consequentialist approaches. For the sake of simplicity, I am 
limiting my comparison of virtue ethics with these two theoretical frameworks, a 
focus that necessarily means ignoring significant but less high-profile ethical theories, 
including communitarian ethics, feminist ethics, discourse ethics, and the principlism 
favoured by medical and bioethics. 
1 1 2  QUAKER STUDIES 
Originating in Greek moral and civic philosophy, and known especially from the 
surviving writings of Aristotle, versions of virtue theory dominated Western moral­
itl until being effectively displaced by the post-Enlightenment philosophies of Mill 
and Bentham on one side of the channel, and of Kant and his successors on the other. 
Since the late 1950s, however, virtue ethics has undergone a renaissance in academic 
philosophy (Hursthouse 1 999; Crisp and Slote 1997). To a large extent this reflects 
dissatisfaction with the inability of the other frameworks to answer the most pressing 
moral questions of modernity, or to give a satisfactory description of moral person­
hood or the ethical life. 
All forms of virtue ethics prioritise moral character over moral behaviour. This 
does not mean that virtue ethicists think that behaviour is irrelevant, or that a bad act 
becomes good if done by a good person. But virtue ethics does hold that the right 
act is not found by following a defined rule or algorithm-the utilitarian calculus, for 
example-but by identifYing what the act of the virtuous person in that situation 
would be. This contrasts with the other major theories which prioritise evaluating 
the act itsel£ The precise criteria for evaluation of an act depend on the theory con­
cerned: where Kantian ethics would ask whether it accords with the categorical 
imperative, utilitarianism looks for the maximisation of happiness (or, strictly speak­
ing, of utility. Utilitarianism continues to argue about exactly what utility is, and 
what relation it bears to different understandings of happiness). Virtue ethics, on the 
other hand, tries first to give an account of the features, traditionally called virtues or 
excellences, that would be expected of a person leading a morally admirable life. 
Such a person, according to the theory, would be able to identifY and carry out the 
ethically correct act in situations of moral difficulty. It is important to the plausibility 
of the theory that virtues are understood as more than desirable quirks making a 
person more likely to be, say, honest or generous. Virtues are better imagined as 
enduring, mutually reinforcing dispositions, similar in many ways to the dispositions 
of the Bourdieusian habitus discussed by Collins (2008: 48-52). Moreover they are 
not exercised as isolated characteristics, but result from mobilising multiple inter­
locking attitudes, understandings, and expectations. 
Virtue ethics' focus on agent as opposed to act does not mean that other moral 
theories ignore the prospect of the good person disposed to do what ought to be 
done. Any agent's readiness to commit herself to obeying a moral duty or to an 
ethical principle, such as maximisation of happiness, must indicate something about 
that agent's inward nature. Furthermore, even diehard deontological and utilitarian 
theorists will acknowledge that rules or principles cannot be applied without exercis­
ing a degree of ethical sensitivity informed by experience. But as May notes, this 
perspective still subordinates being to doing, and 'fails sufficiently to deal with a 
range of moral life that does not conveniently organise itself into deeds we can 
peiform, issues about which we can make decisions or problems which we can solve' 
(May 1994: 78). This is the central criticism levied at act-centred ethical theories. 
Giving an account of the enduring dispositions of a good person is only one part 
of virtue ethics. The second pillar of virtue theory is a person's ability to implement 
the virtues through making the right decisions. This is described in the Aristotelian 
concept of phronesis, or practical wisdom, the art of knowing what to do, and when 
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and how to do it, and is the key to understanding how virtues are put into operation 
in real life. A virtue is a disposition, but not a mindless reflex response to a stimulus. 
Although the basic disposition to act in a particular way has prereflexive, emotional 
roots, it needs to be consciously exercised through the reason of the agent. To a 
moral psychologist, the idea of phronesis includes many of the features associated 
with normative moral competence, including the ability to grasp the relevant features 
of a situation, identify priorities, and have a realistic idea of whether and how to 
intervene and what the consequences are likely to be. The combination of character 
trait and ability to make correct choices means that, while a virtuous person can be 
relied upon to be truthful (for example), she can also perceive salient differences 
between situations in which honesty is called for, and will know how to respond to 
them most appropriately. Phronesis, moreover, is acquired over time, as dispositions 
are laid down through the choices made, and then exercised in making further 
choices based on a gradually accumulating grasp of the values at stake. 
A well-recognised practical problem of virtue ethics is that they are generally less 
helpful than rival frameworks when deciding between conflicting options. Acting in 
accordance with two different virtues (generosity vs. justice, for example, or honesty 
vs. compassion) may lead to opposing conclusions about the right course of action. In 
such cases, which one should take priority? Both utilitarianism and deontological 
approaches may offer clearer resolutions here. On the other hand, as Stohr puts it, 
'virtue ethicists are not rushing to defend the idea that virtue ethics can supply a 
complete decision procedure' (Stohr 2006: 25). For a virtue ethicist, phronesis may 
manifest itself in knowing when to draw on other procedural or substantive resources, 
to resolve issues of priority between virtues. 
Virtue ethics are also distinguished by the rich background picture of the good life 
they offer. Other ethical theories necessarily also contain normative ideas of how 
people ought to live in order to live well, but their focus on acts rather than agents 
means that the conceptualisation of 'living well' is secondary and sketchy. Virtue 
ethics distinctively prioritises the account of the morally excellent life, as the pre­
requisite for morally excellent action. However, there is more than one contempo­
rary version of virtue ethics and while they all agree that the virtues are constitutive 
of the good life, they disagree on the reason(s) why. For some, virtues are the traits 
that enable a person to respond optimally to the moral demands of life. Ethical natu­
ralists consider that to live virtuously is to live a life that, for biological or other non­
moral reasons, is fitting for a human being (Stohr 2006: 24). Others, taking the 
concept of eudaimonia4 as the way of life that is morally good for people, say that the 
virtues are those traits the exercise of which enables a person to flourish, not just as a 
human being but in the way that a eudaimon life requires. 
VIRTUE ETHICS AND QUAKERS 
There are straightforward reasons why deontological or utilitarian approaches may 
not hold much appeal for Liberal Friends. A central one is Quaker belief about the 
source of moral authority, which is connected to the rejection of written creeds. 
1 14 QUAKER STUDIES 
Quakerism gives primary authority to personal experience-of life in general, and 
more specifically to personal experience of the Light. This authority, common to all 
branches of Quakerism, is most explicit and defended most strongly in Liberal 
Quakerism. Deontological ethics, by contrast, is effectively creedal. It emphasises the 
obligation to sign up to a rule, whether religious or other, and, in general, Liberal 
Quakerdom resists appeals to the status of a text or figure over the authority given to 
individual conviction. Hence in the making of British Friends' moral collage in the 
study described earlier, the driving force behind the construction of the collage was 
the need to articulate with integrity each individual's own understanding of the situa­
tion, not whether that understanding was in conformity with scripture or even with 
Quaker precedent. Turning next to utilitarianism, it may be that what has been 
described as the 'utilitarian calculus', the maximisation of benefit for the greatest 
number of people, could never hope to be popular in a group that has rejected 
voting as a decision-making tool. The value Quakers place on social justice is also 
likely to sit uneasily with utilitarianism's inevitable tendency, as a quantitative system 
of sorts, to disadvantage minorities. 
I want to suggest, however, that there are more structural reasons why British 
Friends favour a form of virtue ethics. There are features of virtue ethics which 
parallel beliefs and practices of the Religious Society of Friends in such a way that 
not only are they intrinsically appealing to Friends; they also reinforce the identity of 
the Society of Friends as a social group. These reasons are therefore more sociological 
than they are to do with tenets of Quaker belief I outline some of these below. (For 
the purposes of this analysis I am not going to explore further how Quaker theology, 
or the lack of it, has itself determined how the Society is structured and functions.) 
THE ABSOLUTE PERHAPS 
Several authors acknowledge the cluster of ideas present in contemporary liberal­
Liberal Quakerism indicative of a Quaker epistemology of the 'absolute perhaps' 
(Dandelion 2008): truth is partial, revelation is contextual and limited, spiritual life is 
a journey, the spiritual path involves seeking rather than finding. Quaker episte­
mology and Quaker ethics are deeply historical, contextual, and nonidealistic. By 
contrast, deontological frameworks are in principle none of these; and although 
utilitarianism can be contextual and pragmatic, both deontological and utilitarian 
frameworks operate around an assumption of epistemological closure-the right answer 
can be known, by following the commandment or by undertaking the evaluation 
that produces an irrefutable conclusion. (I recognise of course that these are highly 
simplified versions of the forms of ethical analysis these frameworks offer. My point is 
about the response of a lay group to exactly those fragmentary versions of these 
approaches available in lay moral discourse.) An ethical framework based on interior 
character, on the other hand, presents as more contextual and emergent, necessarily 
contingent on the moral 'revelation' available at a particular place and time. 
LINKAGE OF VIRTUE ETHICS TO TESTIMONY 
Virtue ethics are agent-centred because they make the statement 'I am this kind of 
person' rather than 'I think this is the kind of principle to follow'. Moral philosophers 
SCULl 
may d 
deonto 
men tic 
approa, 
is broa1 
leads h 
about t 
tive tyi 
behavi< 
causalit 
outwar 
generate 
structu1 
Con 
mony, c 
religiot 
stateme 
mode c 
so that 1 
In Qua 
should 
mony) 
easily u 
are gen 
the Soc 
to com 
the env 
the Soc 
the mid 
group" 
tained t 
(Dan de 
A fe\ 
simplici 
the enac 
giving t 
equival< 
oversim 
from th 
virtues­
Accordi 
vital pri 
them in 
(1995: 1 
way to 
QUAKER STUDIES 
:rsonal experience-of life in general, and 
,f the Light. This authority, common to all 
t and defended most strongly in Liberal 
:rast, is effectively creedal. It emphasises the 
religious or other, and, in general, Liberal 
a text or figure over the authority given to 
mg of British Friends' moral collage in the 
Jehind the construction of the collage was 
individual's own understanding of the situa­
in conformity with scripture or even with 
itarianism, it may be that what has been 
: maximisation of benefit for the greatest 
be popular in a group that has rejected 
llue Quakers place on social justice is also 
1evitable tendency, as a quantitative system 
� are more structural reasons why British 
[here are features of virtue ethics which 
ous Society of Friends in such a way that 
Friends; they also reinforce the identity of 
Lese reasons are therefore more sociological 
belie£ I outline some of these below. (For 
�to explore further how Quaker theology, 
v the Society is structured and functions.) 
of ideas present in contemporary liberal­
�r epistemology of the 'absolute perhaps' 
m is contextual and limited, spiritual life is 
king rather than finding. Quaker episte­
;torical, contextual, and nonidealistic. By 
n principle none of these; and although 
;matic, both deontological and utilitarian 
L of epistemological closure-the right answer 
1dment or by undertaking the evaluation 
: recognise of course that these are highly 
nalysis these frameworks offer. My point is 
tctly those fragmentary versions of these 
:.) An ethical framework based on interior 
1ore contextual and emergent, necessarily 
able at a particular place and time. 
,QNY 
1ey make the statement ' I  am this kind of 
Jf principle to follow'. Moral philosophers 
SCULLY VIRTUOUS FRIENDS 115 
may dispute the idea of virtue ethics as always and entirely agent-based, and 
deontological or consequentialist approaches as always and entirely act-based. As I 
mentioned earlier, even in virtue ethics acts are not irrelevant, while act-based 
approaches acknowledge to a limited extent the actor's motivations. Nevertheless, it 
is broadly true that virtue ethics distinctively prioritise what it is about a person that 
leads her to choose one course of action, while the other two prioritise what it is 
about the act that leads a person to choose it. Virtue ethics therefore makes a distinc­
tive type of connection between the inward nature of the person and her outward 
behaviour. The idea of an action being performed 'from virtue' entails a particular 
causality between the action and the agent's beliefs and desires. In virtue ethics 
outward acts are not simply expressive of the agent's interior moral nature; they are 
generated by it, and considerable attention is given to how that internal moral 
structure is developed. 
Continuity of inner and outer life is also central to the Quaker concept of testi­
mony, one of the cornerstones of living as a Quaker. As Dandelion argued ( 1996), 
religious self-identification for Quakers is in terms of behaviour more than through 
statements of belie£ It accords with a model of religious commitment that sees the 
mode of life as the outward evidence of the inner orientation to God, as testimony, 
so that what Friends do5 becomes a more convincing statement of faith than any words. 
In Quaker thinking, testimony relates both to the pattern of life to which Friends 
should adhere, and to the rationale behind that way of life. The global term (testi­
mony) is often broken down into discrete aspects ('the testimonies') that are more 
easily used as guidelines in everyday life. At the start of the twenty-first century these 
are generally held to include the peace testimony (probably the best known outside 
the Society), and testimonies to justice, to simplicity, to equality, to integrity/truth, 
to community, and latterly what has been described as an 'emerging testimony' to 
the environment. Not only has the number of separate testimonies varied through 
the Society's history, but their sociological function has changed as well. Until around 
the middle of the twentieth century they served to mark the separate identity of the 
group against that of the non-Quaker world, while the testimonies that are main­
tained today are more concerned with structuring the Quaker role in the world 
(Dandelion 1996: 121 ). 
A few of the testimonies as given could map directly onto a list of virtues. Honesty, 
simplicity, or integrity would be among these. Others might be better understood as 
the enactment of particular virtues: equality, for instance, might express the virtue of 
giving the same respect to all people. To view the testimonies as unproblematically 
equivalent either to the virtues themselves or to their enactment, however, is a major 
oversimplification. For one thing, not all of the traditional virtues could be extracted 
from the testimonies without some strained reformulation, because-unlike the 
virtues-the testimonies are not intended primarily as a guide to ethical living. 
According to Quaker Faith and Practice the testimonies are 'not abstract qualities, but 
vital principles of life', derived from the 'experience of Friends . . .  that the Light led 
them into an understanding of the Christian life and the way it was to be lived' 
(1995: 1 9.33). Thus testimony is simultaneously an ethical statement (about the right 
way to live), an anthropological statement (about the nature of human beings), a 
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sociological one (about the ordering of the Society), and a theological one (about 
Quakers' relationship with God). Moreover the testimonies, unlike virtues, are not 
themselves the dispositions to act in good ways: rather, they are the moral principles, 
articulated by the Society throughout history, that guide the choices made by Friends 
so that, in the end, the appropriate dispositions are laid down. 
Although the virtues cannot be equated straightforwardly with the testimonies, 
there is nevertheless a significant structural parallel. If the virtues are seen as enduring 
dispositions towards actions that reflect a background commitment to the eudaimon 
life, this is echoed in a view of the testimonies as setting up analogous enduring dis­
positions towards actions that reflect a background commitment to the Quaker ideal, 
the Peaceable Kingdom. The model of right living given by testimony certainly has 
more in common with the virtue approach than it has with those ethical theories that 
evaluate the outward act, more or less detached from the inner life of the agent. The 
right act in utilitarian and deontological theories need not say anything about the 
moral identity of the actor; but for virtue ethics, it is necessarily a reflection of the 
actor's moral commitments, especially if it is part of a consistent pattern of right 
actions. 
If morality and ethics are essentially about how people behave towards each other, 
as I suggested earlier, then to position an individual's behaviour as equivalent to her 
statement of faith is to connect moral life with religious identity in an unusually 
direct way. Obviously, this does not mean that other denominations or faith groups 
exclude moral behaviour from their visions of religious life. It is hard to imagine a 
faith group that would not expect spiritual commitment to be evidenced outwardly 
in the believer's actions. But a religious identity primarily defined through belief 
statements such as 'accepting Jesus Christ as my lord and saviour' does not depend on 
particular behaviours, and hence a gap is inserted between moral life and religious 
commitment. This cannot be the case for a Friend claiming to be a 'good Quaker' in 
any sense that the Religious Society of Friends would find meaningful. 
DISCERNMENT 
Virtue ethics also differ from the other major theories in that discernment, based on 
experience, is an integral part. It is not enough to have a characteristic such as gener­
osity or compassion, or a theoretical grasp of what being generous or compassionate 
means: you have to know how to do it. Knowing how to do it is phronesis, the 
wisdom acquired through experience and practice. For the other major ethical theo­
ries, discernment is not essential, although some degree of wisdom in the exercise of 
ethical judgment will be desirable in practice. In theory, and unlike acting from 
virtue, all you need is to grasp the central rule by which one is bound by obligation, 
or that lies behind the version of utilitarianism you prefer, in order to exercise 
adequate moral behaviour. 
The requirement for phronesis also explains why virtue approaches use a model of 
a socially embedded moral agent. The development of the virtuous person is dependent 
on human interactions: the accumulation of experience in making wise judgments 
about problematic interpersonal situations cannot happen outside a social world in 
which we learn how to do so. Virtue ethics therefore place weight on ethical 
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formation in the family and school, through mentors, role models, and so on, in a 
way that neither utilitarian nor deontological theories do. 
Liberal Quakers will spot an overlap here between the concept of phronesis and 
the Quaker understanding of spiritual discernment. In lay terms the word discernment 
tends to be understood rather passively, as relating to how things are perceived. In 
contemporary Liberal Quaker thinking, however, discernment is a skill the rudiments 
of which are present in each of us, but which can be actively developed in spiritual 
life. Moreover, in Quaker thinking discernment usually means identifying the right 
course of action: according to Quaker Faith and Practice, 'Throughout the discernment 
process there should be one overriding principle before the hearts and minds of all: is 
this individual or group right to believe this action or service has been "laid upon 
them" by God?' (1995: 13.06, my italics). Finally, like phronesis, discernment is tied 
to the model of a collectively embedded moral agent. It is not anticipated that a 
Friend will be able to exercise discernment without guidance from the Quaker 
tradition, as practised in the 'collective phronesis' of discernment during Meeting for 
Worship for Business and similar problem-focused gatherings (Scully 2007). 
I have downplayed one essential difference between phronesis understood in the 
context of secular virtue ethics, and Quaker discernment. This is the source of the 
expertise. Skills of discernment and practical wisdom are both acquired through the 
combination of experience, practice, and internalization of the traditions of the moral 
community. However, Quakers (and other religious groups that use the concept) 
would claim that although discernment requires rigorous thought, it is not a cogni­
tive skill. It has a spiritual source: it requires input from/ access to God. Discernment 
for a Quaker is less about the cognitive skills of perception or assessment than about 
the ability to attend to 'the promptings of love and truth in our hearts' (Quaker Faith 
and Practice 1995: 1.02). 
THE VIRTUE OF CARE 
In Susan Robson's discussion of internal Quaker conflict (Robson 2008) she identi­
fies in passing several characteristics that Friends value, i.e. Quaker virtues. Among 
the expected virtues (honesty, quietness) this empirical observation finds that value is 
placed on self-control and restraint, with a corresponding dislike of vehemence and 
any expression of strong feeling. In the context of internal disagreement, Robson 
finds that 'the thread of relationship exerts more pull than the thread of right out­
come or justice' (2008: 144). What makes this interesting in terms of virtue ethics 
here is the identification of a strong care ethic among Friends. The ethic of care is 
defined as an orientation that prioritises relationality and empathy, rather than rights 
and autonomy, and there is ongoing academic debate about whether care ethics is a 
subspecies of virtue ethics (McLaren 2001) or a broader concept that has a place in 
other ethical theories and approaches as well (Baier 1985; Held 2005). Without 
getting into that debate, it does seem that Robson has identified the existence (and 
drawbacks) of a bias towards care-related virtues in the ethical economy of Quakers. 
Although care ethics was initially associated with feminist ethics (Carol Gilligan's 
original work described a gendered bias towards the use of justice or care concepts in 
moral evaluation; see Gilligan 1982) recent work suggests that relationality is morally 
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prioritised in many socially marginalised groups, including women and ethnic 
minorities (Stack 1979; Cortese 1990; Tronto 1993). The implication is that while 
socially dominant groups can afford to trust in existing frameworks of justice, since 
their experience shows it works for them, marginalised groups must prioritise (or feel 
they must prioritise) mutual support of their members over the formal implementa­
tion of justice. Seeing the Religious Society of Friends apparently operating in the 
same way therefore raises some intriguing questions about Quakers' perception of 
themselves in relation to dominant social organisations. 
QUAKER IDENTITY AND THE DEONTOLOGICAL TETHER 
British Friends have compelling sociological, as well as theological and ethical, reasons 
for taking an approach to moral problems that resembles a virtue ethical theory. This 
does not mean that all Liberal Quakers use virtue ethics in a form that moral philoso­
phy would endorse: moral philosophers will find my account of virtue ethics, and its 
use by Friends, sketchy. Nor does it mean that Friends are only virtue ethicists; their 
strategy is an eclectic one of moral collage, but with more reference made to the 
motivations of the good Quaker than to any other style of ethical thought. 
One of the theoretical limitations of virtue ethics is that it only 'works' as an ethi­
cal system in the context of a common ideal of the good or excellent or virtuous 
person. Virtue theorists are divided on whether there are universal virtues that cut 
across all cultures or if some, at least, are culture-specific. Some virtues seem to go 
out of date: a common example in the literature is how meekness and servility are no 
longer (universally) taken as the markers of the virtuous woman. As Martha Nuss­
baum points out, 'Past writers on virtue, including Aristotle himself, have lacked 
sensitivity to the ways in which different traditions of discourse, different conceptual 
schemes, articulate the world' (Nussbaum 2000: 175). Like other faith groups, the 
Religious Society of Friends today is engaged in ongoing discussion about the shared 
identity, or loss of identity, of post-war British Quakers. Several observers have diag­
nosed the disappearance of a predominantly Christian framework of belief and its 
replacement by multiple, often less clearly defined positions (see Pilgrim and Vincett 
2008), although this has been challenged (Mellor 2008). Dandelion (1996, 2008) has 
identified strategies that enable British Friends to accommodate an ongoing diversifi­
cation of belief by (i) making epistemological uncertainty prescriptive: the 'absolute 
perhaps', and (ii) retaining a collective identity through a Quaker double-culture in 
which a behavioural creed conserves patterns of outward practice as inward belief 
diversifies. 
Dandelion (1996) applied the model of double-culture to behaviours within 
Quaker time, e.g. the format in which Meeting for Worship is held, or the retention 
of archaic terminology. It may also be fruitful to look at it in a more general form, 
less as a separation of the domains of belief and practice and more as a means to 
spiritualise the perforn1ance of religious identity. To an extent all religious groups use 
behaviours and practices to carry their religious self-conceptualisation, since meaning 
is embodied, as Collins's discussion of habitus (2008: 48-52) shows. In sociological 
terms, this is the function of Quakerism's theology of testimony. Part of the appeal of 
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the virtue ethical framework, then, is that its emphasis on an inner nature generating 
certain acts makes it entirely congruent with the Quaker theology of testimony, and 
through such congruence virtue ethics consolidates Quaker identity in a way that 
other ethical frameworks cannot. 
Within the Religious Society of Friends, a shared understanding of what being a 
'good Quaker' involves is generated by a number of routes. The testimonies provide 
not merely the theological rationale for a way of life, but some indication of what 
that way of life should look like. Knowing that 'a testimony to simplicity' is part of 
Quaker orthodoxy indicates that the virtuous Quaker is supposed to lead a simple 
lifestyle, although the details of what constitutes simplicity (or equality, or peace, or 
any other aspect of testimony) in a given context are always up for discussion (see 
Chambers 2008, reprinted above, for one example of how interpretation of testi­
mony is negotiated). Other models for the good Quaker life are provided by the 
written obituaries, known as 'Testimonies to the grace of God as shown in the life of' 
a deceased Friend. These are produced by local Meetings and sent to Friends House, 
the central administrative body of Britain Yearly Meeting, to be published at the 
time of the annual Yearly Meeting gathering. They are distinct in form and content, 
and convey to successive generations a clear sense of the kind of Quaker life that is 
admirable. In these and other ways, a felt sense of a good Quaker life is inculcated. 
Common visions of a good Quaker life are generated at various locations and 
structural levels that differ subtly in which community they represent. The Religious 
Society of Friends as a whole, local and regional Meetings, the numerous specialised 
groups within the Society such as Quaker Action on Alcohol and Drugs (QAAD) or 
the Quaker Lesbian and Gay Fellowship (QLGF), even short events at places like 
Woodbrooke and Swarthmoor Hall,6 are all instances of what Pilgrim calls 
'heterotopia'-real or conceptual spaces that offer the conditions of possibility to be 
other. These are spaces the feminist theologian Sharon Welch referred to as 'commu­
nities of resistance and solidarity' (Welch 1985), and the ethicist Cheshire Calhoun as 
'abnormal moral communities' (Calhoun 1989); within them heterodox opinions can 
be invoked and counterstories (Lindemann Nelson 2001) crafted, with the aim of 
articulating and presenting the meaning of virtuous identity for that particular 
community. It needs to be noted here, however, that 'abnormal' and 'dissident' and 
'hetero-' are always terms relating to a tacit standard. While I argue that the Reli­
gious Society of Friends offers alternative moral discursive/physical/temporal/ 
cognitive space to be 'other' to the wider society, at other times we need to recog­
nise the groups within Quakerdom, such as Quaker Pagans (Vincett 2008), the 
Experiment with Light (Meads 2008), and adolescent Friends (Best 2008) that bear 
the same relationship of otherness to the Religious Society of Friends itself In terms 
of virtue ethics, they are all engaged in the task of providing visions of eudaimonia, 
the excellent life that is their moral goal. 
There is more work to be done here to clarity what makes visions of the good life, 
and certain moral collages of justification, compelling to Quakers while other visions 
and justifications are not. Although there is considerable potential for diversity in the 
understanding of what a 'good Quaker' is, some options are clearly excluded (the 
good Quaker arms dealer is a near impossibility). Some kind of centrifugal core of 
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moral value is present, and it sets the parameters for multiple interpretations of the 
good life to be produced. This is why at the same time as inclining towards a virtue 
ethical approach, British liberal-Liberal Friends also make use of one outstanding 
deontological 'tether', and this is George Fox's injunction that Quakers must 
recognise 'that of God in everyone', the phrase that some writers identifY (Dandelion 
1996: 289; Scully 2002: 217) as the bare minimum left which all Friends can still sign 
up to. Whatever its theological interpretation, it sets the normative standard 
demanded of Friends in their dealings with others. The good Quaker not only 
responds to that of God within herself but recognises and responds to it in others. 
Like 'love your neighbour as yourself, or Kant's categorical imperative that people 
be treated as belonging to the realm of ends, with all the respect and care that entails, 
this Quaker categorical imperative provides the minimum normative core around 
which the virtues of Quakers cohere. The deontological statement that I was at first 
unable to find in this religious group's ethics is present not as a set of command­
ments, but as the heart of the Religious Society ofFriend's vision ofhow best to live, 
through which contemporary Quaker identity is operationalised in the individual and 
collective acts of virtuous Friends. 
NOTES 
1. The debate over whether these 'oughts' derive primarily from the non-moral realm of society 
or biology (for example, that we ought not to kill each other because doing so produces unstable 
societies) or whether they are primarily rooted in some kind of ethical statement (such as, that killing 
others is wrong because it fails to show proper respect for them as persons) is not one I want to 
enter into here. 
2. The terms 'moral' and 'ethical' are variously defined. In this article I take moral to refer to 
patterns of how people live, ethical to the systematic reflection on it. 
3. Although I refer to Western virtue ethics here, some comparative philosophers consider 
Chinese Confucianism to be a school of virtue ethics. 
4. Eudaimonia is a notoriously hard concept to translate, but in Aristotelian virtue ethics it con­
notes a broad idea of happiness in the sense of flourishing and doing well. 
5. I mean this in terms of how they behave in the world rather than 'how they go about being 
religious', that is, not the behavioural forms that Dandelion claims are the social glue for British 
Liberal Quakers, but everyday ethical and social choices. 
6. W oodbrooke is the Quaker study centre near Birmingham and Swarthmoor Hall is a build­
ing in Cumbria of major significance in Quaker history. Both run courses and events, often 
residential, for Quakers or other interested people. 
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